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In this article we study an extension of the vector balancing game investigated by
Spencer and Olson (which corresponds to the on-line version of the discrepancy
problem for matrices). We assume that decisions in earlier rounds become less and
less important as the game continues. For an aging parameter q1 we define the
current move to be q times more important than the previous one.
We consider two variants of this problem: First, the objective is a balanced partition
at the end of the game, and second, it is to ensure a balanced partition throughout
the game. We concentrate on the case q2. We give an optimal solution for the
first problem and a nearly optimal one for the second.  2001 Academic Press
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1. INTRODUCTION AND RESULTS
1.1. Vector Balancing Games as On-line Version of the Discrepancy Problem
A vector balancing problem (also referred to as discrepancy of matrices)
consists of a finite set X of vectors and the task is to partition this set into
two classes X1 and X2 such that the two sums. x # Xi x, i=1, 2, over all
vectors in each class are ideally equal. A partition like this is called balanced.
In general, of course, a perfectly balanced partition does not exist. The
objective then is to minimize the imbalance &x # X1 x&x # X2 x& for some
norm & }&.
It is convenient to represent the 2-partition by a mapping =: X  [&1, +1]
such that =(x)=1 holds if and only if x # X1 . With this setting we can express
the imbalance vector x # X1 x&x # X2 x corresponding to the partition
(X1 , X2) simply by x # X =(x) x.
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A widely investigated special case is the discrepancy problem for hyper-
graphs. Here the objective is to partition the set of vertices of a hypergraph
in two classes such that all hyperedges are roughly split into equal parts by
this partition. By taking the column vectors of the incidence matrix as set X,
the discrepancy problem for hypergraphs transforms into a vector balancing
problem. For a deeper insight into discrepancy theory we recommend the
survey of Beck and So s [3] as well as the fourth chapter of Matous ek’s
recent book [7].
In this paper we focus on the on-line version of the vector balancing
problem. The additional difficulty there is that one does not know the set
of vectors at the beginning, but gets to know them one by one and has
to decide on a sign without knowing the next vectors to come. For the
analysis of this problem it is convenient to translate it into the language of
games (this is a natural approach for many on-line problems). The idea is
to represent both the unpredictability of the vectors and the one struggling
for a balanced partition by two competing players. This yields the follow-
ing two-player perfect information game:
Each round the first player (baptized ‘‘Paul’’ or ‘‘pusher’’ by Spencer)
selects a vector x from some given set XRd. The second player (‘‘Carol,’’
‘‘chooser’’) then chooses a sign = # [&1, +1] and the position vector p,
initially set to zero, is changed to p+=x. The first player’s aim is to maximize
&p& for some given norm & }&, while the second player tries to minimize this
quantity. We call &p& the pay-off for the first player.
A game of this kind is called a vector balancing game or ‘‘pusher-chooser
game.’’ As mentioned, strategies for the second player correspond to the
on-line algorithms for the vector balancing problem. On the other hand,
strategies for the first player give lower bounds on how good an on-line
algorithm can possibly be.
1.2. Previous Results
Several forms of vector balancing games have been studied. They differ
in the set of vectors available to the first player and the norm that is used
to determine the pay-off. A variant is to allow a buffer of some size where
the second player can store some vectors and thus postpone the decision
on the respective signs. These are some results of the different types:
Unit ball games: For a fixed norm & }& the first player may choose
any vector with norm at most one, i.e. X=[x # Rd | &x&1], and the
pay-off is measured using the same norm. For the Euclidean or 2-norm it
is not difficult to show that both players have strategies ensuring that
&p&2- n respectively &p&2- n holds after n rounds. We say that the
value of this game is - n.
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For the maximum norm & }& , Spencer [10] gave an upper bound of
- 2n ln(2d ). For the d round game he proved a lower bound of - d log d_
(1&o(1)) in [11].
Discrete games: For games with finite set X, Barany [1] found a
complete solution. His result implies that in the case X=[0, 1]d and & }&=
& }& the value of the game played sufficiently many rounds is 2d&2.
Games with buffer: The first result allowing a buffer is due to Barany
and Grunberg [2]. They show that given a buffer of size d the second
player can keep &p& below 2d no matter what norm is used (the same
norm is required in the definition of X=[x # Rd | &x&1] and the pay-
off). This was improved by Peng and Yan [9], who proved that a buffer
of size d&1 already suffices. They also remark that for the 2norm allow-
ing a buffer of less than d&1 vectors gives no improvement compared to
the no-buffer case.
1.3. Our Contribution
All games cited above relate to on-line problems without temporal
aspects. By this we mean that a decision is the same important throughout
the game. In this article we will assume that a decision made in the past
(i.e. in an earlier round of the game) is less important than a newer one.
This is represented by the different update rule p := 1q p+=x for some aging
parameter q>1. Hence the current decision is q times more important than
the preceding one. We restrict ourselves to the maximum norm unit ball
game, that is, the first player selects vectors from [x # Rd | &x&1], and
the pay-off is measured using & }& on p as well. Since we will not need any
other norms let us agree that from now on & }& shall always denote the
maximum norm & }& .
Immediately we see that the pay-off is bounded by qq&1 . This is due to
the update rule which rescales the importance of decisions in the past
relative to the actual one. A different approach working with absolute
values is the following: In round i the first player chooses a vector x(i ) with
norm at most qi&1 and the the second player updates the position vector
either to p :=p+x(i ) or p :=p&x (i ). The values of an n round game then
differs from our approach by a factor of qn&1. Hence we lose nothing by
investigating the first approach which we find more natural.
The nature of the game is different depending on whether the aging
parameter is at least 2 or not. In the first case the aging aspect is dominant.
The strategies are completely different from the ones in the game without
aging, that is q=1. For 1<q<2 the aging is less important. This case
requires strategies different from the non-aging case and the pure aging
case with q2. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to the case q2 in this
paper.
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Contrary to the no-buffer games described in the previous section, in our
setting there are reasonable strategies such that the maximum value for &p&
does not necessarily occur after the last round. This motivates the distinc-
tion of two versions of the game: First, the value of &p& after the last round
is the pay-off for the first player, and second, the maximum value of &p&
occurred during the game is the pay-off for the first player. We call the two
versions the fixed end version and continuous version respectively. The
second version also refers to the case that the game is played for a fixed
number of rounds which is not known to the second player.2
We show that the fixed end version of the game has value q&q
&wlog2 d x
q&1 if
at least log2 d+1 rounds are played (otherwise it is
q&q&r+1
q&1 , where r
denotes the number of rounds). Note that the number q&q
&wlog 2 d x
q&1 is the
maximum imbalance that can occur in a wlog2 dx+1 round game by putting
all vectors into the same partition class. We may thus interpret our result like
this: The optimal strategy for the second player in the fixed end vector balanc-
ing game leads to a partition which is perfect apart from the last wlog2 dx+1
vectors. This seems to be a more intuitive way of stating the result. Let us
therefore define
vq(r) :=
q&q&r+1
q&1
,
the maximum imbalance that can occur in an r round game by putting all
vectors into the same partition class.
For the continuous version we show that the first player can get a pay-off
of at least
q&2q&wlog2 d x&wlog2 log2 d x+1
q&1
(again assuming sufficiently many rounds played), while the second player
has a strategy keeping &p& below qq&1&q
&log2 d&log2 log2 d&4 throughout the
game. In particular, the value v of this game satisfies
vq(wlog2 dx+wlog2 log2 dx&1)vvq(log2 d+log2 log2 d+5).
We see that the continuous problem is significantly harder than the fixed
end version (this also applies to their respective analyses).
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2 Actually, Spencer’s proof for the upper bound in [10] also requires the second player to
know the number of rounds. Olson [8] later gave a strategy that does not need this informa-
tion and still yields the same bound (apart from constants).
The fixed end version with q=2 has a nice theoretical application. In
[5] it is used to prove that
lindisc(A)2(1&2&wlog2(m)x&1) herdisc(A)
(2(1& 12m) herdisc(A))
holds for any matrix A # Rm_n. This improves an earlier result in this direc-
tion by Lova sz et al. [6] and Beck and Spencer [4], and is a step towards
Spencer’s conjecture lindisc(A)2(1& 1n+1) herdisc(A).
2. THE FIXED END PROBLEM
In this section we analyze the version of the vector balancing game with
aging where the pay-off for the first player is the value of &p& after a fixed
number n of rounds. The objective of the players thus is an imbalanced
(respectively a balanced) partition at the end of an n round game. Let us
fix the rules of this game, which we denote by Gndq :
Initially the position vector p # Rd is zero. A round of the game consists
of three steps:
(i) Player A selects a vector x # Rd such that &x&1,
(ii) Player B chooses a sign = # [&1, +1],
(iii) the position vector is updated to p := 1q p+=x.
The game is played for n rounds. The value &p& at the end of the game is
the pay-off for player A, i.e. Player A aims to maximize &p& and Player B
to minimize this quantity. The maximum pay-off Player A can enforce is
called the value v(Gndq) of the game.
In the following let us assume that q2. In the analysis of this case (see
the proof of Theorem 1 below) we exhibit a surprising phenomenon. It
turns out that mainly the last wlog2 d x+1 moves are important. For this
reason the players need to know the number of rounds. Any value &p& that
Player A might have reached up to round n&wlog2 d x&1 will not only
not help him, but even be contraproductive. Hence up to this point the
players will pursue the opposite aims. The optimal strategy for player A is
to select x(i )=0 for all but the last wlog2 d x+1 moves, thus minimizing
&p& in this stage of the game.
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Theorem 1. Assume q2 and let n, d # N. Set r :=min[n, wlog2 dx+1].
The value of the game Gndq is
v(Gndq)=
q&q&r+1
q&1
=vq(r).
Proof. Player A has the following strategy: Choose the first n&r vectors
as zero (x(i ) :=0 for all i # [n&r]). The last r vectors choose like this: Com-
ponents with index greater than 2r are always set zero (for instance). For
an index i=1+r&1j=0 aj 2
j2r, a0 , ..., ar&1 # [0, 1] and a p # [0, ..., r&1]
set x (n& p)i :=2ap&1. Here is an example for d=5:
x( j )=(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) for i # [n&3]
x(n&2)=(&1, &1, &1, &1, 0)
x(n&1)=(&1, &1, +1, +1, 0)
x(n)=(&1, +1, &1, +1, 0).
Whatever signs =( j ) # [&1, +1], j # [n] are chosen, there will always be an
index i # [2r] such that x (n&r+1)i = } } } =x
(n)
i # [&1, +1]. From
:
n
j=1
q&n+ jx ( j )i =x
(n)
i :
r&1
j=0
q& j=x (n)i
1&q&r
1&
1
q
we conclude that the value of the game is at least q&q
&r+1
q&1 .
This bound is sharp, as the following strategy for Player B reveals. If
r=n, then any choice of signs =(1), ..., =(r) by Player B keep the pay-off
below our claimed value. Hence let us assume r<n. Whatever vectors
x(1), ..., x(n&r) Player A chooses in the first n&r rounds, pick =(1), ...,
=(n&r) :=+1 (any other choice would do, too). Set p :=n&rj=1 q
&n+ jx ( j ).
Choose the next sign =(n&r+1) # [&1, +1] in such a way that the number of
indices i # X1 :=[i # [d] | pi {0] such that sgn( pi) and sgn(=(k&r+1)x (k&r+1)i )
are different is maximal. Set
X2 :=[i # X1 | sgn( pi)=sgn(=(k&r+1)x (n&r+1)i )].
Next choose =(n&r+2) # [&1, +1] such that the number of indices i # X2
such that sgn( pi) and sgn(=(n&r+2)x (n&r+2)i ) are different is maximal. Set
X3 :=[i # X2 | sgn( pi)=sgn(=(n&r+2)x (n&r+2)i )].
Continue in this fashion until =(n) and Xr are determined.
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Note that
|Xj+1 |w 12 |X j |x
for all j # [r&1]. From |X1 |d we conclude |Xr |<1, that is Xr=<. So
for every index i # [d] there is a j # [n&r+1, ..., n] such that sgn( pi){
sgn(=( j )x ( j )i ), or pi=0. The worst caseand here q2 comes into play
is the one where for one index i # [d] all =( j )x ( j )i , j # [n&r+1, ..., n] are 1
(or &1) and pi is zero. For the pay-off at the end of the game we thus have
" :
n
j=1
q&n+ j=( j )x( j )"=" :
n
j=n&r+1
q&n+ j=( j )x( j )+ p"
 :
r&1
z=0
q&z
=
1&q&r
1&
1
q
.
This ends the proof. K
3. THE CONTINUOUS PROBLEM
In this section we investigate the version of the problem where we want
to ensure a balanced partition throughout the game. We consider the case
that the game is played on and on, and that the pay-off for Player A is the
supremum over all values of &p& that occurred during play. From the view-
point of the second player, this is equivalent to saying that the game Gndq
is played with the additional restriction that he does not know the number
of rounds. We denote this game by Gdq .
A particular sequence of moves respecting the rules of the game shall be
called an instance of the game. Formally, it is a pair I=((x(i ))i # N , (=(i ))i # N)
such that &x(i )&1 and =(i ) # [&1, +1] for all i # N. From the definition we
see that the pay-off for this instance is
sup
n # N
:
i # [n]
qn&i=(i )x(i ).
Let us assume again q2. This will not be necessary for the main ideas of
the proof, but the result gets less interesting for q close to 1. We show
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Theorem 2. The value of the game Gdq is bounded by
q&2q&wlog2 dx&wlog2 log2 dx+1
q&1
v(Gdq)
q
q&1
&q&log2 d&log2 log2 d&4.
In particular,
vq(wlog2 dx+wlog2 log2 dx&1)v(Gdq)vq(log2 d+log2 log2 d+5).
Similarly to the fixed end version of the game we will also work with
strategies of ‘‘changing signs.’’ A first strategy for player B is to enforce a
‘‘change of signs’’ in every block Bk of rounds (k&1)(wlog2 dx+1)+1, ...,
k(wlog2 dx+1). This is equivalent to saying that Player B should play
according to his strategy of Section 2 assuming all rounds k(wlog2 dx+1),
k # N to be last rounds. In the worst case, this might lead to a subsequence
of rounds S=[(k&1)(wlog2 dx+1)+2, ..., (k+1)(wlog2 dx+1)&1] such
that for some index j # [d] all the 2 wlog2 dx values =(i )x (i )j , i # S have the
same sign different from zero.
We show that Player B can do much better: He has a strategy such that
for every index j # [d] and any set S of at least log2 d+log2 log2 d+5
successive rounds there are i1 , i2 # S such that sgn(=(i1)x (i1)j ){sgn(=
(i2)x (i2 )j )
or x (i1)j =x
(i2)
j . This bounds the value of the game Gdq as the next lemma
shows.
Lemma 1. Let r # N.
(i) Suppose that for every sequence (x(k))k # N of vectors Player B can
choose his moves (= (k))k # N in such a way that for every k # N and every index
i # [d] not all signs sgn(=(k)x (k)i ), ..., sgn(=
(k+r)x (k+r)i ) are equal and different
from zero.
Then v(Gdq)
q
q&1&q
&rvq(r+1).
(ii) Suppose that Player A has a strategy using &1, 1 vectors such that
there exist k # N and i # [d] such that all numbers =(k)x(k)i , ..., =
(k+r&1)x (k+r&1)i
are equal.
Then v(Gdq)
q&2q&r+1
q&1 vq(r&1).
Proof. Let (x (k))k # N be a sequence of vectors in [&1, 1]d and (=(k))k # N
be a sequence in [&1, +1].
Assume first that for every k # N and every index i # [d] not all numbers
=(k)x (k)i , ..., =
(k+r)x (k+r)i have the same sign different from zero. Let k>r and
p := j # [k] q&k+ j=( j )x( j ) denote the position vector at the end of round k.
Let i # [d]. As not all of the numbers =(k&r)x (k&r)i , ..., =
(k)x (k)i have the
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same sign, | pi | is maximal if x (k&r)i is zero and other numbers =
( j )x ( j )i ,
j # [k&r+1, ..., k] are all 1 or all &1. Thus we have
| pi |= } :j # [k] q
&k+ j=( j )x ( j )i } :
j{k&r
j # [k]
q&k+ j<
q
q&1
&q&r.
Assume now that all vectors are &1, 1 vectors and there are k # N and an
index i # [d] such that all numbers =(k)x (k)i , ..., =
(k+r&1)x (k+r&1)i are equal.
Let p := j # [k+r&1] q&k&r+1+ j=( j )x( j ) denote the position vector at the
end of round k+r&1. We have
| pi |= } :j # [k+r&1] q
&k&r+1+ j=( j )x ( j )i }
 } :
k+r&1
j=k
q&k&r+1+ j=( j )x ( j )i }& } :
k&1
j=1
q&k&r+1+ j=( j )x ( j )i }
 :
r&1
j=0
q& j&q&r :
k&2
j=0
q& j
>
1&q&r
1&
1
q
&q&r
1
1&
1
q
=
q&2q&r+1
q&1
. K
Note that an upper bound of
q
q&1
&
2q&r+1
q&q&r
can be shown by applying the assumption of changing signs not only on
the last r+1 vectors, but on every group of r+1 vectors. A similar argument
improves the lower bound slightly.
By Lemma 1 the analysis of Gdq is reduced to sign changing strategies.
Ignoring for the moment the possibility that some x (r)i might be zero, we
notice: By choosing =(r)=1, a change of sign is inflicted on all those com-
ponents i such that sgn(x (r)i ){sgn(=
(r&1)x (r&1)i ), while choosing =
(r)=&1
yields a change of sign on the opposite components. We may therefore
investigate a simplified game Cd (which in particular is independent of q):
Given are d piles p1 , ..., pd of, say, cards that initially hold one card each.
A round of this game consists of the three steps
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(i) Player A selects a set S[d] of piles,
(ii) Player B either removes all cards from the piles in S or all cards
from the piles in [d]"S. Formally, B chooses a set T # [S, [d]"S] and
resets pi :=0 for all i # T.
(iii) One card is placed on every pile ( pi :=pi+1 for all i # [d]).
The game is played infinitely many rounds. The pay-off for Player A is the
maximum value of &p& that occurred during play. This game is similar to
the tenure game Spencer investigated in [12]. Instead of step (iii), there a
card is added only to those piles pi that have pi {0. Hence the number of
active piles reduces in play and finally is zero. The tenure game has a nice
solution: Both players do their best if they choose their moves in such a
way that the potential function i # [d] 2i is maximized respectively mini-
mized. For the game Cd a solution like this can not be expected as all piles
keep active throughout the game.
Before analyzing the game Cd let us first fix the connection with Gdq :
Lemma 2. Suppose that the value of Cd is r, i.e. Player B has a strategy
such that no pile ever contains more than r cards and Player A can enforce
a pile of height r. Then Player B has a strategy as in Lemma 1(i) and
Player A has a strategy as in Lemma 1(ii). In particular, the value of Cd
determines the value of Gdq almost completely:
vq(v(Gd)&1)v(Gdq)v(v(Gd)+1).
Proof. Let IG=((x( j )) j # N , (=( j )) j # N) be an instance of the game Gdq .
We call an instance IC=((S ( j )) j # N , (T ( j )) j # N) of Cd corresponding to IG
if
(i) \j # N : S ( j )=[i # [d] | sgn(= ( j )x ( j )i )=sgn(x
( j+1)
i ){0],
(ii) \ j # N : T ( j )=S ( j )  = ( j+1)=&1.
In particular IC is uniquely determined by IG .
Suppose IG and IC as above and corresponding. Then for all i # [d] and
k # N we have
i # T (k)  |sgn(=(k)x (k)i )+sgn(=
(k+1)x (k+1)i )|1.
Note that the right-hand side just means that =(k)x (k)i and =
(k+1)x (k+1)i have
different signs or are both zero. Hence for an index i # [d] and r # N we
have that all numbers =(k)x (k)i , ..., =
(k+r&1)x (k+r&1)i have the same non-zero
sign if and only if i  T (k) _ } } } _ T (k+r&2). This is equivalent to the fact
that the position vector p(k+r&2) after round k+r&2 in Cd fulfills p (k+r&2)i
r. Thus it is enough to show that Player B can choose signs in game
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Gdq such that the corresponding instance of Cd has value at most r and
Player A can choose [&1, 1] vectors such that the corresponding instance
of Cd has value at least r.
Player B’s strategy for Cd yields the following strategy for the game
Gdq . For the first move in Gdq Player B may choose any sign =(1). After
A’s second move x(2) set S (1)=[i # [d] | sgn(= (1)x (1)i )=sgn(x
(2)
i ){0].
Choose T (1) # [S (1), [d]"S (1)] according to the strategy that keeps the
position vector in Cd at norm at most r. If T (1)=S (1) select =(2)=&1 in
Gdq , and =(2)=1 otherwise. Continue like this for all rounds of the game. It
is clear that IG=((x( j )) j # N , (=( j )) j # N) and IC=((S ( j )) j # N , (T ( j )) j # N) are
corresponding instances such that at no time any pile in IC gets higher than r.
The following strategy serves for Player A. For the first move in Gdq
Player A may choose any [&1, +1] vector x(1). Set p=(1, ..., 1) # Rd. Let
S (1) be a choice of A in Cd following the strategy that enforces a pile of
height r once in the game Cd . Define x(2) # Rd by
x(2)i :={=
(1)x (1)i
&=(1)x (1)i
if i # S
else
.
If Player B chooses =(2)=&1, set T (1)=S (1), else set T (1)=[d]"S (1).
Update the position vector p of the card game as required by the rules.
Continue like this for the rest of the game. As Player A is following his
strategy for Cd , there will once be a pile of height r. By definition these
instances of the vector game and the card game are corresponding. Thus
there are k # N, i # [d] such that all numbers =(k)x (k)i , ..., =
(k+r&1)x (k+r&1)i
have the same sign different from zero. This shows that A’s strategy for
Gdq is as required by Lemma 1(ii). K
To complete the proof of Theorem 2 we bound the value v(Cd) of the
card game Cd .
Lemma 3. For d3 the value of the card game Cd satisfies
wlog2 dx+wlog2 log2 dxv(Cd)
log2 d+log2 log2 d
log2 \2& 1log2 d+
+1
log2 d+log2 log2 d+4.
For d=2 we have v(Cd)=2.
Proof. The case d=2 is solved by a moment’s thought, so let us assume
d3. We first observe that the order of the piles is irrelevant, hence we
may describe the actual position vector by an expression xn11 x
n2
2 } } } x
nl
l
meaning that there are ni piles each holding xi cards for all i # [l]. Similarly,
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a move by Player A (which is a subset S of the index set [d]) can be described
by such an expression (again it is not important which of the possibly several
piles of same size are in S).
We start with a strategy for Player A. Let us assume first that d is a power
of 2. It is clear that Player A can change a position vector xn1
1
xn2
2
} } } xnll , where
all ni , i # [l] are even, to the position vector (x1+1)n1 2 (x2+1)n2 2 } } }
(xl+1)nl 2 1d2 by selecting the set xn1 21 x
n2 2
2
} } } xnl 2l . Repeated application
of this strategy on the initial position vector of 1d leads to the position
(log2 d+1)1 (log2 d )1 (log2 d&1)2 (log2 d&2)4 } } } 2d41d2.
We call a partial position (which is just the restriction of p to a subset
of [d]) a logarithmic ladder of type L(s, e, l ) for some s, e, l # N, sl, if
it equals se(s&1)2e (s&2)4e } } } (s&l+1)2 (l&1) e. In this notation we just
showed that Player A can enforce a logarithmic ladder L(log2 d, 1, log2 d ).
We now show that Player A can enforce a logarithmic ladder L(s+1, 1,
w l2x) from a position containing a logarithmic ladder L(s, 1, l ). A’s first
move is S=L(s, 1, w l2x). If B chooses S, then (among other piles) a logarithmic
ladder L(s&w l2x, 2wl2x, W l2 X) remains and is updated to L(s+1&w l2x, 2wl2x,
W l2 X) in step (iii) of this round. By the equi-partition argument from above
(applied w l2x times) Player A can enforce a logarithmic ladder L(s+1, 1, W l2X).
On the other hand, if B chooses the complement of S, then S is simply updated
to L(s+1, 1, w l2x).
Applying this logarithmic ladder partition strategy wlog2 log2 dx times on
L(log2 d, 1, log2 d), Player A can reach a logarithmic ladder L(log2 d+
wlog2 log2 dx, 1, 1), which is nothing more than a single pile of height log2 d+
wlog2 log2 dx. This proves the lower bound for d a power of 2. If d is not a
power of 2, Player A fixes a set of 2wlog2 dx piles, plays on these piles according
to the strategy just described and ignores the remaining piles.3 For the upper
bound set * := 2 log2 d&1log2 d and v: N  R; i [ *
i&1. Set v( p) :=i # [d] v( pi) for a
position vector p # Nd. We analyze the strategy for Player B to choose that one
of the alternatives which minimizes v( p) for the resulting position vector p.
Write p b T for the position vector resulting from p if Player B chooses the set
T of piles to be emptied. We have
v( p b T)=|T | v(1)+ :
i # [d]"T
v( pi+1)=|T |+* :
i # [d]"T
v( pi ).
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3 Joel Spencer (private communication, 2000) noted that the last two paragraphs can be
replaced by a potential function argument. Having reached the position (log2 d+1)1 (log2 d)1
(log2 d&1)2 (log2 d&2)4 } } } 2d41d2, Player A may use his strategy from the tenure game. This
means trying to maximize the potential function v( p)=i # [d] 2 pi. Doing so involves the so-called
splitting lemma which states that he can split the piles into two groups having similar potential.
See [12] for the details. As a result of this approach, the lower bound improves to
wlog2 d+log2(2+log2 d)x. This is not so important for our purposes, but both beautiful and a
great step towards the determination of the exact value of this game.
We claim that Player B can ensure v( p)d log2 d throughout the game. This
is clear for the start (where pi=1 for all i # [d]), so let us assume that we are
in some round such that the position vector p at the start of this round fulfills
v( p)d log2 d. Let S[d] denote A’s move and T be one of the alternatives
S and [d]"S which minimizes v( p b T). Then
v( p b T)
1
2
(v( p b S)+v( p b ([d]"S)))
=
1
2 \ |S|+ :i # [d]"S *v( pi)+|[d]"S|+ :i # S *v( pi)+
=
1
2
(d+*v( p))

1
2 \d+
2 log2 d&1
log2 d
d log2d+
=d log2 d.
Hence B’s strategy ensures that v( p)d log2 d holds throughout the game.
This implies
*pi&1=v( pi)v( p)d log2 d
for all i # [d]. Hence
&p&log*(d log2 d )+1=
log2 d+log2 log2 d
log2 \2& 1log2 d+
+1log2 d+log2 log2 d+4,
where the last inequality follows from some calculus. K
The proof of Theorem 2 follows from Lemmas 1 to 3.
4. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
This paper is a first exposition of vector balancing problems that contain a
temporal aspect. For a specific aging assumption we gave optimal respec-
tively quasi-optimal strategies for the two different problems that a balanced
partition is required at the end of the game and throughout the game.
There are many balancing problems with some aging aspect thinkable. We
believe that the one we chose is one of the more interesting ones. Let us briefly
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analyze what happens if we add the aging aspect to the problems mentioned
in the introduction:
For the & }&2-norm problem the non-aging case simply generalizes to
Theorem 3. Let q1. The vector balancing game Gndq where the maximum
norm is replaced with the Euclidean norm has value
 :
n&1
i=0
1
q2i
.
It makes no difference whether the players know the number of rounds or not.
Allowing a buffer seems a little strange. On the one hand time plays an
important role (aging) and on the other decisions can be postponed (buffer
concept). Some results also give the impression that buffers are not very
helpful: For the fixed end version Gndq with q2, it is easy to see that a
buffer does not change the value of the game. This also leads to a lower
bound for the continuous version. Similarly, for the Euclidean game of
Theorem 3 a buffer of size less than d&1 gives no improvement. For a
buffer of any size - d&1i=0 1q2i is a lower bound. Hence for q not too close
to 1, the effect of a buffer is small.
Discrete vector balancing games (i.e., the first player may choose his
vectors from a finite set) are harder to analyze. As our fooling strategies
used &1, 0, +1 vectors only, our lower bounds are still valid for X=
[&1, 0, +1]d (and the upper ones all the more). For finite sets X different
from that, the problems seems to depend heavily on the individual struc-
ture of X.
A completely different problem arises from a linear aging assumption,
that is, the position vector at the end of round k is defined by
:
min[l, k]&1
i=0 \1&
i
l+ =(k&i )x(k&i )
for some parameter l # N. For small l, that is fast aging, our sign changing
argument is sufficient again. For the fixed end version (n rounds) and
lwlog2 dx+1, the first player can enforce a position vector p satisfying
&p&=min[l, n]&1i=0 (1&
i
l) by the same strategy he used in Section 2.
Similarly, in the open end version he can enforce &p&= l&1i=0(1& il ) if
lv(Cd). Clearly, both of these results are optimal. For larger values of l
the problem is open.
A second open problem is the case 1<q<2 of the games Gndq and Gdq .
232 BENJAMIN DOERR
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank Joel Spencer for drawing my interest on vector balancing games and several
discussions on this topic.
REFERENCES
1. I. Barany, On a class of balancing games, J. Combin. Theory Ser. A 26 (1979), 115126.
2. I. Barany and V. S. Grunberg, On some combinatorial questions in finite dimensional
spaces, Linear Algebra Appl. 41 (1981), 19.
3. J. Beck and V. T. So s, Discrepancy theory, in ‘‘Handbook of Combinatorics’’ (R. Graham,
M. Gro tschel, and L. Lova sz, Eds.), 1995.
4. J. Beck and J. Spencer, Integral approximation sequences, Math. Programming 30 (1984),
8898.
5. B. Doerr, Linear and hereditary discrepancy, Combin. Probab. Comput. 9 (2000), 349354.
6. L. Lova sz, J. Spencer, and K. Vesztergombi, Discrepancies of set-systems and matrices,
Eur. J. Combin. 7 (1986), 151160.
7. J. Matous ek, ‘‘Geometric Discrepancy,’’ Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1999.
8. J. Olson, A balancing strategy, J. Combin. Theory Ser. A 40 (1985), 175178.
9. H. Peng and C. H. Yan, Balancing game with a buffer, Adv. Appl. Math. 21 (1998),
193204.
10. J. Spencer, Balancing games, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 23 (1977), 6874.
11. J. Spencer, ‘‘Ten Lectures on the Probabilistic Method,’’ Soc. for Industr. and Appl.
Math., Philadelphia, 1987.
12. J. Spencer, Randomization, derandomization and antirandomization: Three games, Theoret.
Comput. Sci. 131 (1994), 415429.
233VECTOR BALANCING GAMES WITH AGING
